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Abstract
Introduction Outcome-based payment models (OBPMs) might solve the shortcomings of fee-for-service or diagnostic-related 
group (DRG) models using financial incentives based on outcome indicators of the provided care. This review provides an 
analysis of the characteristics and effectiveness of OBPMs, to determine which models lead to favourable effects.
Methods We first developed a definition for OBPMs. Next, we searched four data sources to identify the models: (1) sci-
entific literature databases; (2) websites of relevant governmental and scientific agencies; (3) the reference lists of included 
articles; (4) experts in the field. We only selected studies that examined the impact of the payment model on quality and/or 
costs. A narrative evidence synthesis was used to link specific design features to effects on quality of care or healthcare costs.
Results We included 88 articles, describing 12 OBPMs. We identified two groups of models based on differences in design 
features: narrow OBPMs (financial incentives based on quality indicators) and broad OBPMs (combination of global budgets, 
risk sharing, and financial incentives based on quality indicators). Most (5 out of 9) of the narrow OBPMs showed positive 
effects on quality; the others had mixed (2) or negative (2) effects. The effects of narrow OBPMs on healthcare utilization 
or costs, however, were unfavourable (3) or unknown (6). All broad OBPMs (3) showed positive effects on quality of care, 
while reducing healthcare cost growth.
Discussion Although strong empirical evidence on the effects of OBPMs on healthcare quality, utilization, and costs is 
limited, our findings suggest that broad OBPMs may be preferred over narrow OBPMs.
Keywords Outcome-based payment models · Health reform · Payment models in healthcare · Health outcomes · Healthcare 
costs · Quality of care
JEL I180
Introduction
In most developed countries, policy makers are searching 
for payment systems which stimulate the quality of care 
and reduce healthcare costs. The predominant fee-for-ser-
vice and diagnosis-related group (DRG) models incentiv-
ize volume, and are, therefore, widely considered to be an 
important reason for rising costs in healthcare [1]. While 
incentivizing volume can lead to reduced waiting times 
and better access to healthcare, fee-for-service and DRG 
models lack incentives for improving quality: providers 
are paid for the quantity of care that they deliver, not for 
the impact on the health status of their patients [2]. Since 
the start of this century, pay-for-performance (P4P) mod-
els became popular as a response. In P4P models, reim-
bursement of healthcare providers explicitly depends on 
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meeting predefined quality targets, which, to date, have 
largely been based on process and structure indicators [3]. 
Though models based on these indicators have been stud-
ied extensively, evidence that these P4P models are (cost-)
effective is limited [4, 5]. In addition, it is still unclear 
whether the results of initially effective P4P models are 
sustainable [4–6]. Many authors emphasize the important 
influence of adequate design features, including the selec-
tion of incentivised indicators, on the effectiveness of P4P 
models [4, 7–15].
Over the last decade, the different shortcomings of P4P 
models based on structure and process indicators have 
been addressed by an increased incorporation of outcome 
indicators. The question is if this increased focus on out-
comes has resulted in better quality of care and/or reduced 
cost growth, or if there are other design features that are 
(more) important.
However, a comparative evaluation of payment models 
with an increased focus on outcomes is lacking. There-
fore, we conducted a systematic review of the literature 
on the effects of these new models. Our objective is to 
synthesize the evidence of the effects on quality of care, 
healthcare utilization, and healthcare costs. This will lead 
to better understanding of the consequences of these mod-
els, and will help to determine which design features lead 
to favourable effects, and why. In addition, it might lead 
to further development and implementation of effective 
payment models.
In this paper, we use the term ‘outcome-based payment 
models’ (OBPMs) to denote payment models with a sub-
stantial reliance on outcome indicators. Although this term 
is frequently used in the literature, there is no uniform def-
inition [16, 17]. For example, there is no standard about 
the minimum use of outcome indicators, while only a few 
models use outcome indicators exclusively. When creating 
a definition for OBPMs, we noted that, in P4P models, out-
come indicators typically contribute less than 10% to the 
performance-related incentive payments (see the examples 
in [9, 16–18]). Based on this finding and on expert opin-
ions in the field (Appendix A3), we choose for a pragmatic 
approach to consider programmes OBPMs if at least 10% 
of the performance-related incentive payment is determined 
by scores on outcome indicators. We adopted the following 
definition:
An outcome-based payment model is a payment model 
in healthcare in which the performance-related incen-
tive payments for the healthcare providers depend for 
at least 10% on outcomes of the provided care, and 
which is designed to stimulate favourable effects in 
terms of quality of care or healthcare costs.
We address the following questions: (1) What are the 
design features of OBPMs and to what extent do they differ 
from each other? (2) What are the effects of OBPMs on 
quality of care, healthcare utilization, and healthcare costs?
Methods
Inclusion and exclusion criteria
Included articles had to describe the effects on quality of 
care, healthcare utilization, or healthcare costs of at least 
one OBPM that matched the definition mentioned in the 
introduction. In this article, quality of care is assessed by 
the scores on quality indicators according to the Donabedian 
framework (structure, process and outcome indicators) [19]. 
‘Outcome’ is defined as ‘the effects of care on the health 
status of patients and populations’ [19]. We do not distin-
guish between intermediate outcomes (e.g., blood pressure 
values), final outcomes (e.g., mortality, complication rates, 
and hospital readmissions), and patient-reported outcomes. 
‘Healthcare costs’ are defined according to the definition 
of the OECD: ‘the sum of expenditure on activities that—
through application of medical, pharmaceutical, and nursing 
knowledge and technology—have certain healthcare-related 
objectives’ [20].
Articles written in English and published between Janu-
ary 2000 and October 2016 were included. We only included 
effects that were achieved in OECD countries [21], since the 
aims and contexts of programmes in other countries are too 
different to allow a useful comparison. To be as comprehen-
sive as possible, we did not focus on a specific healthcare 
sector (e.g., in- or outpatient care), despite typical differ-
ences in incentive structures that might exist across sectors. 
There was also no restriction in study design; qualitative 
studies, quantitative studies, and reviews were all eligible 
for inclusion. However, articles describing only simulated 
or expected effects were excluded. Because we expected that 
many evaluations of OBPMs are not published in scientific 
peer-reviewed journals, we included governmental and other 
research reports (provided that they matched our inclusion 
and exclusion criteria) to ensure a complete inclusion of 
information. Letters, editorials, and viewpoints that did not 
contain primary research were excluded.
Search strategy
We used four data sources to ensure a comprehensive search. 
First, we searched three databases with scientific literature 
(Medline, the Cochrane Library, and EMBASE), using the 
keywords listed in Appendix A1. Second, we consulted web-
sites of relevant governmental and/or scientific agencies (see 
Appendix A2). Third, we searched through the references of 
the yielded documents. Finally, we consulted several experts 
in the field, all of whom responded (see Appendix A3).
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Selection procedure
Titles and abstracts of the documents yielded by the three 
scientific databases were checked for duplicates and remain-
ing articles were screened for relevance. Full texts of seem-
ingly relevant articles were subjected to the inclusion and 
exclusion criteria. To determine if a model matched our defi-
nition of an OBPM, we sometimes searched for additional 
information about the model on the Internet via Google, 
using programme-specific keywords. The selection proce-
dure was done independently by two reviewers. Meetings 
were held to minimise interobserver bias. Differences were 
resolved in a discussion between the reviewers, if necessary 
after consultation of a third reviewer.
Next, articles found on websites of the consulted agen-
cies, articles that were brought to our attention by the con-
sulted experts, and articles retrieved from references of 
included documents were subjected to the inclusion and 
exclusion criteria.
Data extraction
To extract and summarize the data, we developed an extrac-
tion form (Appendix B). This form contained the three 
elements:
• name, country, and period in which the model was oper-
ating;
• design features of the payment model;
• effects on quality of care, healthcare utilization and 
healthcare costs.
A methodological challenge was the fact that payment 
models tend to change over time, sometimes on an annual 
basis, e.g., indicators were added or removed, payment struc-
ture changed. To address this, we searched for additional 
information about the changes in programme design over 
time. If, due to these changes, the model did not meet our 
definition of OBPM in a specific year, the results achieved 
in that year were not taken into account. The process of data 
extraction was performed by two independent reviewers.
Study appraisal
To appraise the methodological quality of the included 
quantitative studies, we used the generic and widely applied 
method described by Downs and Black [22]. In the Downs 
and Black method, articles receive points on 27 items cov-
ering 4 domains: reporting, external validity, internal valid-
ity, and power. The more points an article receives, the 
higher the methodological quality of the article. The maxi-
mum number of points is 32 [22]. We chose this generic 
appraisal method because of the expected heterogeneity of 
the included study designs, e.g., interrupted time series, 
observational cohort studies, and cross-sectional studies. To 
determine the methodological quality of included qualitative 
studies and reviews, we used the Critical Appraisal Skills 
Programme checklists [23, 24]. These appraisal methods 
have been used in other systematic reviews of the effects of 
payment models in healthcare [4, 25, 26].
The study appraisal was performed by one reviewer; a 
second reviewer then did an independent review of all quali-
tative studies and reviews, plus a random selection of 10% 
of the included quantitative studies. Meetings were held to 
minimise interobserver bias. Differences were resolved in a 
discussion between the reviewers, if necessary after consul-
tation of a third reviewer.
Results
Included studies
Figure 1 summarizes the search flow. The 88 included arti-
cles contained 75 quantitative studies, 8 qualitative studies, 
3 research reports, and 2 reviews. All quantitative studies 
had a quasi-experimental design (difference-in-difference 
and case-control design). They had an average Downs and 
Black score of 11.7 (out of 32) and a standard deviation of 
1.9 (Appendix A4). Most points were lost on items about 
internal validity and statistical power.
One quantitative study contained results for two OBPMs, 
and one policy report contained results of three OBPMs. The 
rest of the yielded documents described only one model. In 
total, we identified 29 OBPMs (Appendix A5), of which 
12 could be included for our analysis. Tables 1, 2 provide 
the general characteristics and the design features of the 12 
included OBPMs.
Based on the general characteristics (Table 1) and the 
design features (Table 2), we identified two types of OBPMs. 
We called the first-group ‘narrow OBPMs’. The models 
comprising this group focus exclusively on explicit finan-
cial incentives for objectively measured quality, with the 
incorporation of relatively many outcome indicators (i.e., 
pertaining to > 10% of performance-related reimbursement). 
In these models, providers earn bonuses and/or suffer penal-
ties based on their scores on a predefined set of indicators. 
These models typically target one provider type (e.g., hos-
pitals and primary care physicians) and/or specific clinical 
areas (e.g., care for acute myocardial infarction). The other 
group of models is called ‘broad OBPMs’. These models 
encompass the entire provider payment by combining global 
budgets and shared savings incentives with explicit financial 
incentives for quality indicator scores. This group of models 
generally targets multidisciplinary provider groups provid-
ing different types of care for their patient population.
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Effects of OBPMs
Most articles (58) describe effects on quality of care only, 9 
articles on healthcare utilization or healthcare costs, and 21 
articles on both quality and utilization/costs. The follow-up 
period varies from 9 months to 7 years. Table 3 summa-
rizes the effects of OBPMs on quality of care and healthcare 
utilization/costs.
Effects on quality of care
Regarding the effects of the models on quality of care, evi-
dence is available for all 12 models. Of the 88 included stud-
ies, 79 targeted quality of care.
Incentivised indicators
All three broad OBPMs showed improvements on the incen-
tivised indicators. Process indicators improved in multiple 
studies [9, 27, 28, 48–50], while improvement of outcome 
indicators was only found for diabetes and vascular care in 
one study (AQC) [49]. No improvement was found in out-
come indicators for substance use disorder patients [51], 
emergency department use (both AQC) [52], or hospital 
readmissions (Pioneer ACO) [53].
For the narrow OBPMs, five out of nine models showed 
positive results on the incentivised indicators (CQUIN, 
HRRP, Maryland HACP, QOF, and VIP) [33, 35, 40, 42, 
45, 54–59]; one showed mixed results (Hudson health plan) 
[34, 60]; in two models, no significant effect was found 
(PAMC, VBP) [38, 61–64]. In the remaining model (HQID), 
some improvements were observed in the first phase of the 
programme (first 3 years), but, after some alterations in the 
design, these improvements did not last [9, 31, 65–68].
As, in the broad OBPMs, process indicators showed larger 
improvements than outcome indicators. Five out of nine pro-
grammes (CQUIN, HQID, Hudson Health plan, QOF, and 
VIP) reported improvements in certain process indicators 
[9, 40, 42, 45, 54–60, 65, 66, 69–72], while four (HRRP, 
Maryland HACP, QOF, and VIP) showed improvements in 
Fig. 1  Search flow and results Inial search result through databases : 3143 
arcles
Included arcles:81
(12 OBPM’s)
Search through reference lists: 7 addional arcles
Websites of consulted agencies: 
7 addional arcles
Total number of relevant arcles: 508 
(116 potenal OBPM’s)
Excluded models that did not meet our definion of 
an OBPM: 87 models (400 arcles)
Total number of included arcles: 88 
(12 OBPM’s)
Expert consulng: 2 addional arcles
Excuded arcles aer reading tle and abstract: 
1823 arcles
Duplicaons: 821 arcles
Total number of relevant arcles: 499 
OBPM’s that were excluded due to lack of effect 
studies: 17 models (27 arcles)
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outcomes [33, 35, 56, 59, 71–75]. Two of these could not 
show improvements in process indicators, because these 
models only included outcome indicators (HRRP and Mary-
land HACP). Outcome indicators that showed improvements 
were hospital readmissions after acute myocardial infarc-
tion (HRRP) [33], hospital-acquired conditions (Maryland 
HACP) [35], blood pressure and lab results for diabetes 
and renal disease (both QOF) [56, 71–73], mortality after 
stroke (VIP) [59], emergency hospital admissions (QOF) 
[74], and homecare placements for patients with dementia 
(QOF) [75]. However, most outcome indicators did not sig-
nificantly improve [34, 62, 63, 76, 77], the mortality rate in 
particular remaining unaffected (in HQID, QOF, and VBP) 
[31, 62, 63, 65, 67, 68, 78].
While the effects of broad OBPMs on quality of care 
increased over time [9, 27, 28, 48], positive effects of nar-
row OBPMs tended to be short-lived. In two broad OBPMs 
(AQC and Pioneer ACO), effects on the incentivised indica-
tors increased over the years [9, 27, 28, 48]. In contrast, two 
narrow OBPMs (HQID and QOF) showed ceiling effects. 
For HQID, this occurred after a significant revision of the 
incentive structure [9, 66, 79, 80], while for QOF diabetes 
and asthma indicators already reached a ceiling after the first 
year [69]. For most of the other indicators in the QOF, ceil-
ing effects emerged after years 2 or 3 [42, 70], when many 
GP practices exceeded the quality thresholds for maximum 
incentive payments [55]. However, the percentage of hospi-
tal emergency admissions continued to decrease as a result 
of the QOF [74].
Relevant provider and patient characteristics
Private providers and providers with low baseline quality 
scores improved their performance the most (Hudson Health 
plan, MSSP, Pioneer ACO, QOF, VBP, VIP) [45, 59, 60, 71, 
81–84], although some studies concerning the VBP report 
relatively poor performance of initially low-scoring provid-
ers, and in HQID safety net hospitals performed relatively 
poorly [9, 61–63, 67, 79, 80]. Among the narrow OBPMs, 
three models (HQID, Hudson Health plan, QOF) show that 
large providers outperform smaller ones [30, 60, 85]. In the 
VBP model, this scale effect is mixed [83, 84, 86].
It remains unclear if high-need patients benefit more 
from OBPMs than other patients. In the AQC, children 
with special needs benefitted more than others from pre-
ventive paediatric care [50]. In the QOF, quality of care for 
diabetics with co-morbidities improved more than for those 
without co-morbidities [87]. In contrast, mental health cen-
tres (AQC), nursing homes (QOF), and hospitals with more 
Medicare and Medicaid patients (VBP) showed significantly 
lower quality scores after introduction of a OBPM [49, 51, 
84, 88]. In the Hudson Health Plan, there was no change Ta
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in quality of care for patients both with and without co-
morbidities [34].
Effects on healthcare utilization and costs
Regarding the effects on healthcare utilization and health-
care costs, three (out of nine) narrow OBPMs are included 
(13 studies) in the analysis. Of the broad OBPMs, all three 
models were included (17 studies).
Healthcare utilization
For five models (AQC, HQID, Hudson Health Plan, Pioneer 
ACO, and QOF), data were available about effects on health-
care utilization. Two out of three narrow OBPMs showed 
an increase in healthcare utilization. Prescription of preven-
tive drugs increased (antibiotics in HQID [65] and antihy-
pertensive drugs in the QOF [89]). Moreover, the number 
of newly diagnosed diabetics who started with medication 
increased (QOF) [90]. In the Hudson Health Plan, no signifi-
cant change in healthcare utilization was found [34].
Contrary to the narrow OBPMs, the two broad OBPMs 
showed a reduction in healthcare utilization. For the 
AQC, reductions among Medicare patients were reported 
in emergency department use, the use of outpatient care, 
office visits, minor procedures, imaging, and diagnostic 
tests [91]. This is in line with the reduction of healthcare 
utilization found 4 years after the introduction of the AQC 
[48]. However, there was no significant impact on the use of 
pharmaceuticals [92], while small increases were reported 
for the use of mental health services [49] and emergency 
departments [52]. For the Pioneer ACO programme, a reduc-
tion in inpatient services was found [53].
Healthcare costs
All three broad OBPMs (AQC, MSSP, Pioneer ACO) 
showed a cost saving based on the incentives of the pro-
gramme [9, 27, 28, 48, 53, 91]. The MSSP led to a cost sav-
ing of about $385 million within 1 year, while the Pioneer 
ACO reached a comparable cost reduction after 2 years [9, 
53]. For the third model (AQC), two out of six studies did 
not find an effect on healthcare costs [50, 52], while four 
studies that were performed later found savings of 1.9, 3.3, 
and 6.8% after 1, 2, and 4 years after introduction, respec-
tively [27, 28, 48, 91].
In broad OBPMs, the cost containment effects increased 
over time. Several studies reported no or small cost reduc-
tions in the first years of the AQC programme [27, 52, 93], 
while these reductions increased after 1 or 2 years [28, 48, 
91]. For the Pioneer ACO programme, one study found simi-
lar effects [9], but another study reported the opposite [53]. 
For the narrow OBPMs, no longitudinal evaluation studies 
were available with respect to the impact on costs.
Of the narrow OBPMs, costs increased in all three mod-
els for which results are available. This is due to the bonus 
Table 3  Effects of OBPMs on 
quality of care and healthcare 
utilization/costs
Effects are regarded positive when at least 65% of the articles find that a significant improvement in qual-
ity of care or reduced healthcare costs. When the majority of studies found that the quality of care did not 
improve (or worsened) or healthcare costs increased, we considered the effect negative
? unknown
a After 3 years, the HQID adopted some design changes. In the first-phase quality of care improved, the sec-
ond phase was less successful
b One of the aims of this programme was to increase the income of general practitioners substantially
Model Quality of care Healthcare utiliza-
tion/costs
Number of 
studies
Downs and Black 
score: mean (SD)
Narrow OBPMs
 CQUIN + ? 3 9.0 (1.0)
 HQID Mixeda − 13 11.4 (1.6)
 HRRP + ? 2 9.0 (1.0)
 Hudson Health Plan Mixed − 2 13.0 (0)
 Maryland HACP + ? 1 10.0 (0)
 PAMC P4P − ? 2 10.5 (2.5)
 QOF + −b 43 11.9 (1.9)
 VBP − ? 9 11.5 (2.3)
 VIP + ? 3 12.0 (2.0)
Broad OBPMs
 AQC + + 10 12.4 (1.1)
 MSSP + + 2 11.0 (0)
 Pioneer ACO + + 2 11.0 (0)
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payments [41, 60, 68, 78, 94]. The HQID does not report any 
significant effect on healthcare costs, but, in the calculation, 
the $17 million that was spent on bonus payments was not 
taken into account [68, 94]. Hudson Health Plan, a relatively 
small programme, spent over $1 million on bonus payments 
[60]. In the QOF (where a substantial income increase for 
general practitioners was one of the objectives), over £5 bil-
lion was spent in the first 7 years of the programme [41, 
78], resulting in a 26–40% increase of income for general 
practitioners [69, 95].
Unintended consequences
For four models (AQC, HQID, Maryland HACP, and QOF), 
studies were available about effects on non-incentivised indi-
cators. For broad OBPMs, data are only available for the 
AQC. The included studies for this model showed no obvi-
ous effect (positive nor negative) on non-incentivised indica-
tors [50, 91]. In contrast, for the narrow OBPMs, some signs 
of negative effects exist: while HQID shows no effects on 
not included indicators [65, 79], in the Maryland HACP, the 
incidence of non-incentivised hospital-acquired conditions 
increased [35]. In the QOF, there was no change in mortal-
ity for either incentivised or non-incentivised diseases [78], 
but (non-incentivised) continuity of care decreased [69]. 
Another study regarding the QOF showed an initial improve-
ment in non-incentivised indicators for asthma, diabetes, and 
vascular diseases, but, after 2 years, these effects decreased 
to below baseline level [42].
In three narrow models (HQID, Hudson Health plan, 
QOF), the effects on ethnic and social disparities were ana-
lysed, finding little to no improvement, and sometimes a 
deterioration. In HQID, the existing gap on process qual-
ity closed between blacks and whites, but differences in 
mortality remained [31]. In the Hudson Health Plan, the 
existing disparities in immunisation rates remained [60]. 
For QOF, seven out of nine studies found no effects on 
existing social or ethnic disparities [40, 56, 70, 73, 96–98]. 
One study showed a decrease between deprived and not 
deprived patients [41], while another noticed an increasing 
gap between socioeconomic groups [77].
For the HQID, the HRRP, and the QOF (all narrow 
OBPMs), several studies examine whether or not providers 
have been trying to abuse the model by directly or indirectly 
manipulating the performance scores (gaming). In general, 
there is a little evidence that this occurred on a large scale. 
For HQID and HRRP, no evidence was found that hospi-
tals delay readmissions, alter discharge statuses, limit the 
access for high-risk patients, or focus on the most profitable 
measures [33, 99, 100]. In the QOF, the generally low levels 
of exception reporting suggest that large-scale gaming is 
uncommon [40, 76, 101–104], although some suspect vari-
ations in performance scores were noticed [101, 102].
Discussion
Summary of principal findings
This review provides an evidence synthesis of the charac-
teristics and effectiveness of 12 OBPMs. Based on differ-
ences in design features, two groups of OBPMs were dis-
tinguished: narrow OBPMs, which only contain explicit 
financial incentives for objectively measured quality per-
formance; and broad OBPMs, which combine global budgets 
and risk sharing for multidisciplinary provider groups with 
explicit financial incentives for quality. Although only three 
broad OBPMs could be included in this review, their effects 
on both quality of care and healthcare utilization/costs 
are particularly favourable when compared to the narrow 
OBPMs. In addition, these effects improved over time in the 
broad OBPMs, while the effects of narrow OBPMs tended to 
be short-lived. We also found that process indicators showed 
larger improvements than outcome indicators in both groups 
of OBPMs. Other findings were: larger private providers 
and providers with initially poor quality scores tended to 
score better than other providers; high-need patients did not 
seem to benefit more from OBPMs than other patients; broad 
OBPMs had a little effect on non-incentivised indicators, 
while there are signs that non-incentivised indicators may 
deteriorate in the narrow OBPMs; narrow OBPMs did not 
seem to decrease social or ethnic disparities; and narrow 
OBPMs do not seem to lead to gaming on a large scale.
Explanations and comparisons to the existing 
literature
In both groups of OBPMs, process indicators showed larger 
improvements than outcome indicators. In a way, this may 
be considered disappointing as it raises the question what the 
value is of focussing financial incentives on outcomes. One 
explanation is that outcomes are generally more difficult to 
influence by providers than processes. Another explanation 
is that improvements in processes may precede improve-
ments in outcomes, especially in the short term. However, 
although some studies suggest that the link between pro-
cesses and outcomes is often not straightforward [105]. 
Finally, the improvements on indicator scores could be due 
to ‘signalling power’: the implementation of a payment 
model can lead to increased attention to the incentivised 
indicators. This attention, rather than the design features of 
the payment model, could lead to improvements on easy 
to influence (process) indicators. Nonetheless, the fact that 
processes improve is positive, given that many earlier evalu-
ations of P4P programmes (which have focused mainly on 
processes) show mixed effects on process indicators [4].
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The broad OBPMs showed increasing improvements on 
quality indicators over time, while the effects of the narrow 
OBPMs tend to be short-lived. This may be due to broad 
OBPMs generally being less prone to ceiling effects due to 
a design in which explicit incentives based on objectively 
measured indicators are combined with more general pay-
ment mechanisms (i.e., global budgets with risk-sharing 
arrangements). In addition, the finding that relatively poor 
performers improve more is another indication of the exist-
ence of ceiling effects, which are reported in some of the 
included models [9, 42, 55, 66, 69, 70, 79, 80].
We also found that cost savings in broad OBPMs tend to 
increase over time. In addition, narrow OBPMs typically 
show increases in healthcare utilization, while broad OBPMs 
show reductions. These effects might be explained by the 
additional focus on cost containment in broad OBPMs (i.e., 
global budgets and risk sharing), while narrow OBPMs 
focus on quality alone.
Literature on P4P models shows results comparable to our 
findings on narrow OBPMs: there is evidence that both types 
of models increase (process) quality of care, although results 
are mixed and there is no evidence that non-incentivised 
indicators improve [4]. This might be due to similarities in 
the design: despite the incorporation of more outcome indi-
cators, the working mechanism of narrow OBPMs is often 
analogous to that of P4P models (i.e., bonuses or penalties 
for achieving predefined targets with respect to explicitly 
measured quality indicators).
We found that larger private providers and providers with 
initially poor quality scores tend to score better than other 
providers. A possible explanation is that large private pro-
viders and providers with low baseline quality have more 
improvement potential. Moreover, these findings might be 
influenced by the ceiling effects found in two models (HQID 
and QOF). In these models, it was relatively easy to achieve 
a maximum score on some indicators. The distance to 
these maximum scores from the baseline (i.e., the achieved 
improvements) is larger in initially low-scoring providers. 
On the other hand, providers with relatively many minority 
patients or with patients with a lower socioeconomic status 
are known to have poorer quality metrics. Financial incen-
tives run the risk of exacerbating these disparities across 
providers. For example: there is evidence that safety net hos-
pitals suffer more from the financial penalties introduced by 
P4P than other hospitals [106].
Strengths and limitations
This review has multiple strengths and limitations. The 
strengths are: (1) this is the most comprehensive review 
on OBPMs to date, comparing 12 different OBPMs from 
3 different countries; (2) this review has been conducted 
systematically and multiple data sources were used; (3) 
the reviewed studies have a relatively high average level of 
evidence, since all included quantitative studies adopted 
a quasi-experimental design. However, as in the previous 
reviews on payment models [26], experimental studies are 
lacking. This is largely due to the nature of the intervention 
(i.e., payment models), which often precludes experimental 
study designs. In addition, for 8 of the 12 models, only up 
to 3 studies were available. For these models, the results on 
quality of care or healthcare costs have a limited scientific 
base.
The use of our definition of OBPMs results in four limi-
tations. First, the required minimum 10% dependence on 
outcomes set by the definition is an arbitrary cut-off point; 
it does not take the total size of the performance-related 
reimbursement into account. There is also no evidence for 
a critical cut-off point in incentive size related to effective-
ness. Setting the cut-off point at a lower percentage might 
have resulted in the inclusion of more programmes, possibly 
in more countries. However, the 10% threshold seems to 
allow a reasonably effective distinction between more and 
less outcome-based payment models.
Second, in five of the included programmes (AQC, 
CQUIN, HQID, VBP, and VIP), we could not determine 
with absolute certainty if at least 10% of the total incen-
tive payments were always linked to outcome indicators, 
since these models use separate indicator sets in different 
geographical regions or care settings. Nevertheless, exclud-
ing payment models of which we know that they match our 
definition in almost all regions or care settings would harm 
the generalisation of our results. We only included OBPMs 
when the information at our disposal consistently confirmed 
that the model matched our definition and that there were no 
major differences in specific regions or care settings. This 
was the case for all five aforementioned OBPMs.
Third, we acknowledge that incentives emanating from 
payments linked to good scores on outcome indicators might 
be weaker in included OBPMs with small total incentive 
payment sizes (e.g., the HRRP) than in excluded models 
with relatively large total incentive payments but in which 
less than 10% of these payments are linked to outcomes. 
However, incorporating the size of these payments into the 
definition of OBPMs is practically impossible and would 
lead to an unworkable definition, since the required infor-
mation is often not available, especially in payment models 
with complex designs.
A final limitation of our review concerns the generali-
sation of our findings. First, comparing different outcome 
measures, used in different OBPMs, is not ideal. Some out-
come indicators may have more improvement potential than 
others, and the existence of clear guidelines can increase this 
potential. Furthermore, some indicators of the HRRP and the 
VBP programme overlap, since both programmes are imple-
mented in the context of the USA Medicare programme.
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Second, our review includes OBPMs from both in- and 
outpatient sector, which operate differently. Specifically, 
they are subject to different payment and billing systems, 
which affect the incentive structure. In addition, OBPMs in 
the outpatient sector tend to distribute relatively more money 
than OBPMs in the inpatient sector. Nonetheless, it is useful 
to use a broader scope by including both sectors.
Third, the effects of the payment models are likely to 
be influenced by contextual factors. The introduction of 
OBPMs is often part of a larger policy package, such as 
increased registration, public reporting, or implementation 
of feedback systems. Effects can also be influenced by the 
healthcare system of the involved country. The fact that 
models are from different countries leads to challenges in 
drawing conclusions. However, it must be highlighted that 
9 out of the 12 models in this review are from the USA. 
Although this makes a comparison between these nine 
models easier, the USA is a country with exceptionally high 
healthcare costs. Positive effects on healthcare costs might, 
therefore, be easier to achieve than in other countries. Con-
sequently, extrapolation of findings from USA-based studies 
to other healthcare systems is hard.
Conclusions
OBPMs are at the centre of the debate on the future of 
healthcare reimbursement. It is one of the theoretical under-
pinnings of the movement towards value-based healthcare 
which seeks for more quality of care and value against the 
‘lowest’ possible costs [107]. We conclude that an increased 
focus on outcome indicators alone is unlikely to result in 
an increased effectiveness of payment models: other design 
features also influence the effects on quality of care and 
healthcare costs. Specifically, our main findings suggest 
that OBPMs which combine global payments and risk-shar-
ing with explicit bonuses or penalties based on (outcome) 
indicator scores have most potential to contribute to value. 
Based on our results, these ‘broad’ OBPMs seem to be more 
(cost-)effective than the ‘narrow’ OBPMs, as in the latter 
group evidence of improved quality is less consistent and 
tends to be short-lived, and evidence for decreases in health-
care costs is lacking. Despite the limitations of our approach 
and the fact that we still know little about the interaction 
between costs and quality, we feel that we can recommend 
broad OBPMs. However, given that we could only include 
three broad OBPMs, which have all been implemented 
more recently than the ‘narrow’ OBPMs and all in the USA, 
more rigorous evaluations of broad OBPMs are required to 
strengthen this conclusion, preferably in a different context 
than that of the USA.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Crea-
tive Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creat iveco 
mmons .org/licen ses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribu-
tion, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate 
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the 
Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
References
 1. Orszag, P.R., Ellis, P.: The challenge of rising health care costs. 
A view from the Congressional Budget Office. N. Engl. J. Med. 
357(18), 1793–1795 (2007). https ://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMp 
07819 0
 2. Tai, W., Kalanithi, L., Milstein, A.: What can be achieved by 
redesigning stroke care for value-based world? Expert Rev. 
Pharmacoecon. Outcomes Res. 14(5), 585–587 (2014)
 3. Nicholson, S., Pauly, M.V., Wu, A.Y., Murray, J.F., Teutsch, 
S.M., Berger, M.L.: Getting real performance out of pay-for-
performance. Milbank Q. 86(3), 435–457 (2008). https ://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1468-0009.2008.00528 .x
 4. Eijkenaar, F., Emmert, M., Scheppach, M., Schoffski, O.: 
Effects of pay for performance in health care: a systematic 
review of systematic reviews. Health Policy. 110(2–3), 115–
130 (2013). https ://doi.org/10.1016/j.healt hpol.2013.01.008
 5. Milstein, R., Schreyoegg, J.: Pay for performance in the inpa-
tient sector: a review of 34 P4P programs in 14 OECD coun-
tries. Health Policy 120(10), 1125–1140 (2016)
 6. Ryan, A.M., Nallamothu, B.K., Dimick, J.B.: Medicare’s public 
reporting initiative on hospital quality had modest or no impact 
on mortality from three key conditions. Health Aff. (Millwood) 
31(3), 585–592 (2012)
 7. Roland, M., Campbell, S.: Successes and failures of pay for 
performance in the United Kingdom. N. Engl. J. Med. 370(20), 
1944–1949 (2014)
 8. Conrad, D.A., Perry, L.: Quality-based financial incentives in 
health care: can we improve quality by paying for it? Annu. 
Rev. Public Health 30, 357–371 (2009)
 9. Eijkenaar, F., Schut, F.T.: Uitkomstbekostiging in de zorg: een 
(on)begaanbare weg?. Institute of Health Policy and Manage-
ment, Rotterdam (2015)
 10. Eijkenaar, F.: Key issues in the design of pay for performance 
programs. Eur. J. Health Econ. 14(1), 117–131 (2013)
 11. Jha, A.K.: Time to get serious about pay for performance. 
JAMA 309(4), 347–348 (2013)
 12. Mehrotra, A., Sorbero, M.E., Damberg, C.L.: Using the les-
sons of behavioral economics to design more effective pay-for-
performance programs. Am. J. Manag. Care 16(7), 497–503 
(2010)
 13. Rosenthal, M.B., Dudley, R.A.: Pay-for-performance: will the lat-
est payment trend improve care? JAMA 297(7), 740–744 (2007)
 14. Werner, R.M., Dudley, R.A.: Making the ‘pay’ matter in pay-
for-performance: implications for payment strategies. Health 
Aff (Millwood) 28(5), 1498–1508 (2009)
 15. Roland, M.: Pay-for-performance: not a magic bullet. Ann. 
Intern. Med. 157(12), 912–913 (2012)
 16. Eijkenaar, F., van de Ven, W., Schut, F.T.: Uitkomstbekostiging in 
de zorg: internationale voorbeelden en relevantie voor Nederland. 
Institute for Health Policy and Management, Rotterdam (2012)
 17. Hayen, A.P., de Bekker, P.J.G.M., Ouwens, M.M.T.J., Westert, 
G.P., Jeurissen, P.P.T.: No cure, no pay? The road to outcome-
based payments in Dutch healthcare; current situation and oppor-
tunities. Celsus Academy for Sustainable Care, Nijmegen (2013)
230 F. P. Vlaanderen et al.
1 3
 18. Eijkenaar, F.: Pay for performance in health care: an inter-
national overview of initiatives. Med. Care Res. Rev. 69(3), 
251–276 (2012). https ://doi.org/10.1177/10775 58711 43289 1
 19. Donabedian, A.: The quality of care: how can it be assessed? 
JAMA 260(12), 1743–1748 (1988)
 20. (OECD): OECD Health Statistics 2014: Definitions, Sources 
and Methods Health Expenditure and Financing. Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris (2014)
 21. (OECD): Country Classification 2011. Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development, Paris (2011). http://
www.oecd.org/tad/xcred /48405 330.pdf. Accessed 4 Jul 2018
 22. Downs, S.H., Black, N.: The feasibility of creating a checklist 
for the assessment of the methodological quality both of ran-
domised and non-randomised studies of health care interven-
tions. J. Epidemiol. Community Health 52, 377–384 (1998)
 23. (CASP): CASP Qualitative Checklist (2017). http://www.casp-
uk.net/casp-tools -check lists . Accessed 4 Jul 2018
 24. (CASP): CASP Systematic Review Checklist (2017). http://
www.casp-uk.net/casp-tools -check lists . Accessed 4 Jul 2018
 25. van Herck, P., de Smedt, D., Annemans, L., Remmen, R., 
Rosenthal, M.B., Sermeus, W.: Systematic review: effects, 
design choices, and context of pay-for-performance in health 
care. BMC Health Serv. Res. 10, 247 (2010)
 26. Gillam, S.J., Siriwardena, A.N., Steel, N.: Pay-for-performance 
in the United Kingdom: impact of the quality and outcomes 
framework: a systematic review. Ann. Family Med. 10(5), 
461–468 (2012)
 27. Song, Z., Safran, D.G., Landon, B.E., He, Y., Ellis, R.P., 
Mechanic, R.E., Day, M.P., Chernew, M.E.: Health care spend-
ing and quality in year 1 of the alternative quality contract. N. 
Engl. J. Med. 365(10), 909–918 (2011)
 28. Song, Z., Safran, D.G., Landon, B.E., Landrum, M.B., He, Y., 
Mechanic, R.E., Day, M.P., Chernew, M.E.: The ‘alternative 
quality contract,’ based on a global budget, lowered medical 
spending and improved quality. Health Aff. 31(8), 1885–1894 
(2012)
 29. McDonald, R., Kristensen, S.R., Zaidi, S., Sutton, M., Todd, 
S., Konteh, F., Hussein, K., Brown, S.: Evaluation of the Com-
missioning for Quality and Innovation Framework. University 
of Nottingham (2013)
 30. Bhattacharyya, T., Mehta, P., Freiberg, A.A.: Hospital char-
acteristics associated with success in a pay-for-performance 
program in orthopaedic surgery. J. Bone Jt. Surg. 90(6), 1240–
1243 (2008)
 31. Epstein, A.M., Jha, A.K., Orav, E.J.: The impact of pay-for-per-
formance on quality of care for minority patients. Am. J. Manag. 
Care 20(10), 479–486 (2014)
 32. Kahn, C.N., Ault, T., Potetz, L., Walke, T., Chambers, J.H., 
Burch, S.: Assessing Medicare’s hospital pay-for-performance 
programs and whether they are achieving their goals. Health 
Aff. 34(8), 1281–1288 (2015). https ://doi.org/10.1377/hltha 
ff.2015.0158
 33. Mellor, J., Daly, M., Smith, M.: Does it pay to penalize hospitals 
for excess readmissions? Intended and unintended consequences 
of medicare’s hospital readmissions reductions program. Health 
Econ. 15, 1037–1051 (2016). https ://doi.org/10.1002/hec.3382
 34. Chien, A.T., Eastman, D., Li, Z., Rosenthal, M.B.: Impact of 
a pay for performance program to improve diabetes care in the 
safety net. Prev. Med. 55, S80–S85 (2012)
 35. Calikoglu, S., Murray, R., Feeney, D.: Hospital pay-for-perfor-
mance programs in Maryland produced strong results, includ-
ing reduced hospital-acquired conditions. Health Aff. 31(12), 
2649–2658 (2012)
 36. (CMS): Table 33: ACO Quality Measures. https ://www.cms.
gov/Medic are/Medic are-Fee-for-Servi ce-Payme nt/share dsavi 
ngspr ogram /Downl oads/ACO-Share d-Savin gs-Progr am-Quali 
ty-Measu res.pdf (2016). Accessed 8 Feb 2017
 37. Chung, S., Palaniappan, L., Wong, E., Rubin, H., Luft, H.: Does 
the frequency of pay-for-performance payment matter? Experi-
ence from a randomized trial. Health Serv. Res. 45(2), 553–564 
(2010). https ://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6773.2009.01072 .x
 38. Chung, S., Palaniappan, L.P., Trujillo, L.M., Rubin, H.R., Luft, 
H.S.: Effect of physician-specific pay-for-performance incen-
tives in a large group practice. Am. J. Manag. Care 16(2), 35–42 
(2010)
 39. Campbell, S.M., McDonald, R., Lester, H.: The experience of 
pay for performance in english family practice: a qualitative 
study. Ann. Fam. Med. 6(3), 228–234 (2008)
 40. Doran, T., Fullwood, C., Gravelle, H., Reeves, D., Kontopantelis, 
E., Hiroeh, U., Roland, M.: Pay-for-performance programs in 
family practices in the United Kingdom. N. Engl. J. Med. 355(4), 
375–384 (2006)
 41. Doran, T., Fullwood, C., Kontopantelis, E., Reeves, D.: Effect 
of financial incentives on inequalities in the delivery of primary 
clinical care in England: analysis of clinical activity indicators 
for the quality and outcomes framework. Lancet 372(9640), 
728–736 (2008)
 42. Doran, T., Kontopantelis, E., Valderas, J.M., Campbell, S., 
Roland, M., Salisbury, C., Reeves, D.: Effect of financial incen-
tives on incentivised and non-incentivised clinical activities: lon-
gitudinal analysis of data from the UK Quality and Outcomes 
Framework. BMJ 343(7814) (2011)
 43. (HSCIC): QOF Indicator Definitions 2014–15. Health and Social 
Care Information Centre, Leeds (2014)
 44. (CMS): Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Fact Sheet (2017). 
https ://www.cms.gov/Outre ach-and-Educa tion/Medic are-Learn 
ing-Netwo rk-MLN/MLNPr oduct s/Downl oads/Hospi tal_VBPur 
chasi ng_Fact_Sheet _ICN90 7664.pdf. Accessed 10 Apr 2018
 45. Kim, S.M., Jang, W.M., Ahn, H.A., Park, H.J., Ahn, H.S.: Korean 
National Health Insurance Value Incentive Program: achieve-
ments and future directions. J. Prev. Med. Public Health 45(3), 
148–155 (2012)
 46. Yang, J.H., Kim, S.M., Han, S.J., Knaak, M., Yang, G.H., Lee, 
K.D., Yoo, Y.H., Ha, G., Kim, E.J., Yoo, M.S.: The impact of 
Value Incentive Program (VIP) on the quality of hospital care for 
acute stroke in Korea. Int. J. Qual. Health Care 28(5), 580–585 
(2016)
 47. Kristensen, S.R., McDonald, R., Sutton, M.: Should pay-for-per-
formance schemes be locally designed? Evidence from the Com-
missioning for Quality and Innovation (CQUIN) Framework. J. 
Health Serv. Res. Policy 18(2), 38–49 (2013)
 48. Song, Z., Safran, D.G., Landon, B.E., Rose, S., Day, M., 
Chernew, M.E.: Payment reform in Massachusetts: effect of 
global payment on health care spending and quality 4 years into 
the alternative quality contract. J. Gen. Intern. Med. 29, S169 
(2014)
 49. Barry, C.L., Stuart, E.A., Donohue, J.M., Greenfield, S.F., Kouri, 
E., Duckworth, K., Song, Z., Mechanic, R.E., Chernew, M.E., 
Huskamp, H.A.: The early impact of the ‘alternative quality con-
tract’ on mental health service use and spending in Massachu-
setts. Health Aff. (Proj. Hope) 34(12), 2077–2085 (2015). https 
://doi.org/10.1377/hltha ff.2015.0685
 50. Chien, A.T., Song, Z., Chernew, M.E., Landon, B.E., McNeil, 
B.J., Safran, D.G., Schuster, M.A.: Two-year impact of the alter-
native quality contract on pediatric health care quality and spend-
ing. Pediatrics 133(1), 96–104 (2014)
 51. Stuart, E.A., Barry, C.L., Donohue, J.M., Greenfield, S.F., 
Duckworth, K., Song, Z., Mechanic, R., Kouri, E.M., Ebnesa-
jjad, C., Chernew, M.E., Huskamp, H.A.: Effects of account-
able care and payment reform on substance use disorder treat-
ment: evidence from the initial 3 years of the alternative quality 
231Design and effects of outcome-based payment models in healthcare: a systematic review 
1 3
contract. Addiction 12, 124–131 (2016). https ://doi.org/10.1111/
add.13555 
 52. Sharp, A.L., Song, Z., Safran, D.G., Chernew, M.E., Mark Fen-
drick, A.: The effect of bundled payment on emergency depart-
ment use: alternative quality contract effects after year one. Acad. 
Emerg. Med. 20(9), 961–964 (2013)
 53. McCarthy, M.: “Value based” payment project saves US nearly 
$400 m in two years, report finds. BMJ 350, h2432 (2015). https 
://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.h2432 
 54. Shlebak, A., Sandhu, P., Ali, V., Jones, G., Baker, C.: The impact 
of the DoH Commissioning for Quality and Innovation incentive 
on the success of venous thromboembolism risk assessment in 
hospitalised patients. A single institution experience in a quality 
outcome improvement over a 4-year cycle. JRSM Open 7(6), 
2054270416632702 (2016). https ://doi.org/10.1177/20542 70416 
63270 2
 55. Fleetcroft, R., Steel, N., Cookson, R., Walker, S., Howe, A.: 
Incentive payments are not related to expected health gain in the 
pay for performance scheme for UK primary care: cross-sectional 
analysis. BMC Health Serv. Res. 12, 94 (2012)
 56. Millett, C., Gray, J., Saxena, S., Netuveli, G., Khunti, K., Majeed, 
A.: Ethnic disparities in diabetes management and pay-for-
performance in the UK: the Wandsworth Prospective Diabetes 
Study. PLoS Med. 4(6), e191 (2007)
 57. Strong, M., South, G., Carlisle, R.: The UK Quality and Out-
comes Framework pay-for-performance scheme and spirometry: 
rewarding quality or just quantity? A cross-sectional study in 
Rotherham, UK. BMC Health Serv. Res. 9(108) (2009)
 58. Lee, J.Y., Lee, S.I., Kim, N.S., Kim, S.H., Son, W.S., Jo, M.W.: 
Healthcare organizations’ attitudes toward pay-for-performance 
in Korea. Health Policy 108(2–3), 277–285 (2012)
 59. Yang, J.H., Kim, S.M., Han, S.J., Knaak, M., Yang, G.H., Lee, 
K.D., Yoo, Y.H., Ha, G., Kim, E.J., Yoo, M.S.: The impact of 
Value Incentive Program (VIP) on the quality of hospital care 
for acute stroke in Korea. Int. J. Qual. Health Care 20, 580–585 
(2016). https ://doi.org/10.1093/intqh c/mzw08 1
 60. Chien, A.T., Li, Z., Rosenthal, M.B.: Improving timely child-
hood immunizations through pay for performance in medicaid-
managed care. Health Serv. Res. 45(6), 1934–1947 (2010)
 61. Gilman, M., Adams, E.K., Hockenberry, J.M., Milstein, A.S., 
Wilson, I.B., Becker, E.R.: Safety-net hospitals more likely than 
other hospitals to fare poorly under medicare’s value-based pur-
chasing. Health Aff. 34(3), 398–405 (2015)
 62. Figueroa, J.F., Tsugawa, Y., Zheng, J., Orav, E.J., Jha, A.K.: 
Association between the Value-Based Purchasing pay for per-
formance program and patient mortality in US hospitals: obser-
vational study. BMJ 353, i2214 (2016). https ://doi.org/10.1136/
bmj.i2214 
 63. Ryan, A.M., Burgess, J.F., Pesko, M.F., Borden, W.B., Dimick, 
J.B.: The early effects of Medicare’s mandatory hospital pay-for-
performance program. Health Serv. Res. 50(1), 81–97 (2015)
 64. Chee, T.T., Ryan, A.M., Wasfy, J.H., Borden, W.B.: Current state 
of value-based purchasing programs. Circulation 133(22), 2197–
2205 (2016). https ://doi.org/10.1161/circu latio naha.115.01026 8
 65. Mehrotra, A., Damberg, C.L., Sorbero, M.E.S., Teleki, S.S.: Pay 
for performance in the hospital setting: what is the state of the 
evidence? Am. J. Med. Qual. 24(1), 19–28 (2009)
 66. Werner, R.M., Kolstad, J.T., Stuart, E.A., Polsky, D.: The 
effect of pay-for-performance in hospitals: lessons for quality 
improvement. Health Aff. 30(4), 690–698 (2011). https ://doi.
org/10.1377/hltha ff.2010.1277
 67. Jha, A.K., Joynt, K.E., Orav, E.J., Epstein, A.M.: The long-term 
effect of premier pay for performance on patient outcomes. N. 
Engl. J. Med. 366(17), 1606–1615 (2012)
 68. Ryan, A.M.: Effects of the premier hospital quality incentive 
demonstration on medicare patient mortality and cost: quality 
and performance. Health Serv. Res. 44(3), 821–842 (2009)
 69. Campbell, S.M., Reeves, D., Kontopantelis, E., Sibbald, B., 
Roland, M.: Effects of pay for performance on the quality of pri-
mary care in England. N. Engl. J. Med. 361(4), 368–378 (2009)
 70. Lee, J.T., Netuveli, G., Majeed, A., Millett, C.: The effects of pay 
for performance on disparities in stroke, hypertension, and coro-
nary heart disease management: Interrupted time series study. 
PLoS One 6(12), e27236 (2011)
 71. Vaghela, P., Ashworth, M., Schofield, P., Gulliford, M.C.: Popu-
lation intermediate outcomes of diabetes under pay-for-perfor-
mance incentives in England from 2004 to 2008. Diabetes Care 
32(3), 427–429 (2009)
 72. Millett, C., Saxena, S., Netuveli, G., Majeed, A.: Impact of 
pay for performance on ethnic disparities in intermediate out-
comes for diabetes: a longitudinal study. Diabetes Care 32(3), 
404–409 (2009)
 73. Alshamsan, R., Lee, J.T., Majeed, A., Netuveli, G., Millett, 
C.: Effect of a UK pay-for-performance program on ethnic dis-
parities in diabetes outcomes: interrupted time series analysis. 
Ann. Fam. Med. 10(3), 228–234 (2012)
 74. Harrison, M.J., Dusheiko, M., Sutton, M., Gravelle, H., Doran, 
T., Roland, M.: Effect of a national primary care pay for perfor-
mance scheme on emergency hospital admissions for ambula-
tory care sensitive conditions: controlled longitudinal study. 
BMJ 349, g6423 (2014). https ://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.g6423 
 75. Kasteridis, P., Mason, A., Goddard, M., Jacobs, R., Santos, 
R., Rodriguez-Sanchez, B., McGonigal, G.: Risk of care home 
placement following acute hospital admission: effects of a 
pay-for-performance scheme for dementia. PloS One 11(5), 
e0155850 (2016). https ://doi.org/10.1371/journ al.pone.01558 
50
 76. Serumaga, B., Ross-Degnan, D., Avery, A.J., Elliott, R.A., 
Majumdar, S.R., Zhang, F., Soumerai, S.B.: Effect of pay for 
performance on the management and outcomes of hypertension 
in the United Kingdom: interrupted time series study. BMJ 
342(7792), 322 (2011)
 77. Simpson, C.R., Hannaford, P.C., Ritchie, L.D., Sheikh, A., 
Williams, D.: Impact of the pay-for-performance contract and 
the management of hypertension in Scottish primary care: a 
6-year population-based repeated cross-sectional study. Br. J. 
Gen. Pract. 61(588), 443–451 (2011)
 78. Ryan, A.M., Krinsky, S., Kontopantelis, E., Doran, T.: Long-
term evidence for the effect of pay-for-performance in pri-
mary care on mortality in the UK: a population study. Lancet 
388(10041), 268–274 (2016). https ://doi.org/10.1016/s0140 
-6736(16)00276 -2
 79. Ryan, A.M., Blustein, J., Doran, T., Michelow, M.D., Casalino, 
L.P.: The effect of phase 2 of the premier hospital quality 
incentive demonstration on incentive payments to hospitals 
caring for disadvantaged patients. Health Serv. Res. 47(4), 
1418–1436 (2012)
 80. Shih, T., Dimick, J.B.: Does pay-for-performance improve sur-
gical outcomes? Evaluation of phase 2 of the premier hospital 
quality incentive demonstration project. J. Surg. Res. 179(2), 
677–681 (2013)
 81. Nattinger, M.C., Mueller, K., Ullrich, F., Zhu, X.: Financial per-
formance of rural medicare ACOs. J. Rural Health. 24, 98–102 
(2016). https ://doi.org/10.1111/jrh.12205 
 82. Greene, J., Hibbard, J.H., Overton, V.: Large performance incen-
tives had the greatest impact on providers whose quality metrics 
were lowest at baseline. Health Aff. 34(4), 673–680 (2015). https 
://doi.org/10.1377/hltha ff.2014.0998
232 F. P. Vlaanderen et al.
1 3
 83. Chatfield, J.S.: Value-based purchasing: the effect of hospital 
ownership and size. Health Care Manag. 35(3), 199–205 (2016). 
https ://doi.org/10.1097/hcm.00000 00000 00011 6
 84. Zhao, M., Haley, D.R., Spaulding, A., Balogh, H.A.: Value-based 
purchasing, efficiency, and hospital performance. Health Care 
Manag. 34(1), 4–13 (2015). https ://doi.org/10.1097/hcm.00000 
00000 00004 8
 85. Wang, Y., O’Donnell, C.A., Mackay, D.F., Watt, G.C.M.: Prac-
tice size and quality attainment under the new GMS contract: 
a cross-sectional analysis. Br. J. Gen. Pract. 56(532), 830–835 
(2006)
 86. Ramirez, A.G., Tracci, M.C., Stukenborg, G.J., Turrentine, F.E., 
Kozower, B.D., Jones, R.S.: Physician-owned surgical hospitals 
outperform other hospitals in medicare value-based purchasing 
program. J. Am. Coll. Surg. 223(4), 559–567 (2016). https ://doi.
org/10.1016/j.jamco llsur g.2016.07.014
 87. Millett, C., Bottle, A., Ng, A., Curcin, V., Molokhia, M., Saxena, 
S., Majeed, A.: Pay for perfomance and the quality of diabetes 
management in individuals with and without co-morbid medical 
conditions. J. R. Soc. Med. 102(9), 369–377 (2009)
 88. Shah, S.M., Carey, I.M., Harris, T., DeWilde, S., Cook, D.G.: 
Quality of chronic disease care for older people in care homes 
and the community in a primary care pay for performance sys-
tem: retrospective study. BMJ 342(7797), 587 (2011)
 89. Karunaratne, K., Stevens, P., Irving, J., Hobbs, H., Kilbride, H., 
Kingston, R., Farmer, C.: The impact of pay for performance 
on the control of blood pressure in people with chronic kidney 
disease stage 3–5. Nephrol. Dial. Transplant. 28(8), 2107–2116 
(2013)
 90. Gallagher, N., Cardwell, C., Hughes, C., O’Reilly, D.: Increase 
in the pharmacological management of type 2 diabetes with pay-
for-performance in primary care in the UK. Diabet. Med. 32(1), 
62–68 (2014)
 91. McWilliams, J.M., Landon, B.E., Chernew, M.E.: Changes in 
health care spending and quality for medicare beneficiaries asso-
ciated with a commercial ACO contract. JAMA 310(8), 829–836 
(2013)
 92. Afendulis, C.C., Fendrick, A.M., Song, Z., Landon, B.E., 
Safran, D.G., Mechanic, R.E., Chernew, M.E.: The impact of 
global budgets on pharmaceutical spending and utilization: early 
experience from the alternative quality contract. Inquiry 51, 1–7 
(2014). https ://doi.org/10.1177/00469 58014 55871 6
 93. Chien, A.T., Schiavoni, K.H., Sprecher, E., Landon, B.E., 
McNeil, B.J., Chernew, M.E., Schuster, M.A.: How accountable 
care organizations responded to pediatric incentives in the alter-
native quality contract. Acad. Pediatrics. 16(2), 200–207 (2016). 
https ://doi.org/10.1016/j.acap.2015.10.008
 94. Kruse, G.B., Polsky, D., Stuart, E.A., Werner, R.M.: The impact 
of hospital pay-for-performance on hospital and medicare costs. 
Health Serv. Res. 47(6), 2118–2136 (2012)
 95. Whalley, D., Gravelle, H., Sibbald, B.: Effect of the new contract 
on GPs’ working lives and perceptions of quality of care: a lon-
gitudinal survey. Br. J. Gen. Pract. 58(546), 8–14 (2008)
 96. Crawley, D., Ng, A., Mainous, A.G., Majeed, A., Millett, C.: 
Impact of pay for performance on quality of chronic disease 
management by social class group in England. J. R. Soc. Med. 
102(3), 103–107 (2009)
 97. Millett, C., Gray, J., Saxena, S., Netuveli, G., Majeed, A.: Impact 
of a pay-for-performance incentive on support for smoking ces-
sation and on smoking prevalence among people with diabetes. 
CMAJ 176(12), 1705–1710 (2007)
 98. Millett, C., Gray, J., Bottle, A., Majeed, A.: Ethnic disparities in 
blood pressure management in patients with hypertension after 
the introduction of pay for performance. Ann. Fam. Med. 6(6), 
490–496 (2008)
 99. Nicholas, L.H., Dimick, J.B., Iwashyna, T.J.: Do hospitals alter 
patient care effort allocations under pay-for-performance? Health 
Serv. Res. 46(1 PART 1), 61–81 (2011)
 100. Epstein, A.M., Joynt, K.E., Jha, A.K., Orav, E.J.: Access to coro-
nary artery bypass graft surgery under pay for performance: evi-
dence from the premier hospital quality incentive demonstration. 
Circul. Cardiovasc. Qual. Outcomes 7(5), 727–734 (2014). https 
://doi.org/10.1161/circo utcom es.114.00102 4
 101. Doran, T., Fullwood, C., Reeves, D., Gravelle, H., Roland, M.: 
Exclusion of patients from pay-for-performance targets by eng-
lish physicians. N. Engl. J. Med. 359(3), 274–284 (2008)
 102. Doran, T., Kontopantelis, E., Fullwood, C., Lester, H., Valderas, 
J.M., Campbell, S.: Exempting dissenting patients from pay 
for performance schemes: retrospective analysis of exception 
reporting in the UK Quality and Outcomes Framework. BMJ 
344, e2405 (2012)
 103. Gravelle, H., Sutton, M., Ma, A.: Doctor behaviour under a pay 
for performance contract: treating, cheating and case finding? 
Econ. J. 120(542), F129–F156 (2010). http://onlin elibr ary.wiley 
.com/journ al/10.1111/%28ISS N%29146 8-0297/issue s
 104. McDonald, R., Roland, M.: Pay for performance in primary 
care in England and california: comparison of unintended con-
sequences. Ann. Fam. Med. 7(2), 121–127 (2009)
 105. Mant, J.: Process versus outcome indicators in the assess-
ment of quality of health care. Int. J. Qual. Health Care 13(6), 
475–480 (2001)
 106. Shakir, M., Armstrong, K., Wasfy, J.H.: Could pay-for-perfor-
mance worsen health disparities? Health Policy 33(4), 567–569 
(2018)
 107. Porter, M.E., Teisberg, E.O.: Redefining Health Care. Harvard 
Business School Press, Boston (2006)
